Czech Authority Reports Record Fines and Proposes Major Competition-Law Reforms
The Czech competition authority imposed CZK 2.316 billion in first-instance fines through October 2026, mostly in decisions that are still under appeal. At its annual conference, it also outlined proposed new powers to address persistently weak competition, review certain below-threshold mergers, and penalize individuals involved in cartels.
10.11.2026 | Czech competition authority
The Czech competition authority reported that it imposed a record CZK 2.316 billion in fines in first-instance decisions between January and the end of October 2026. The nine fines arose from five cases; most are not final because the parties have appealed to the authority’s chair. Final fines total CZK 75.4 million. The authority opened 65 proceedings during the period: 59 merger cases, five cartel cases (three horizontal and two vertical), and one possible abuse of dominance case. It issued 61 decisions, including 54 on mergers, six on cartels, and one on dominance, and conducted ten unannounced inspections involving 21 companies.
Authority officials said cartel investigations are becoming harder as companies use modern technology to conceal unlawful conduct. The authority is therefore proposing new investigative and enforcement tools in amendments to the competition law. A major example discussed at the conference was the cable manufacturers’ and sellers’ cartel, for which the Czech authority imposed a non-final fine of CZK 1.942 billion. The case began through the leniency programme, and inspections were coordinated with the Slovak authority. The Slovak proceedings covered 12 companies and an industry association, which the authority said had facilitated the cartel. The Slovak authority imposed fines of EUR 97.434 million in that case.
The proposed “new competition tool” would allow the authority to intervene in markets where competition has been persistently ineffective, even if there is no conventional infringement of competition law. Following a sector inquiry establishing market dysfunction, the authority could issue generally applicable measures to open the market to competition. Possible measures include requiring access to data, setting non-discriminatory standards, or changing contractual terms. In extreme cases, the authority could order the divestment of part of a business. Conference participants debated how market failure should be defined and warned that an overly broad definition could create uncertainty; others argued that existing enforcement tools leave gaps, including in cases of tacit collusion.
The draft amendments would also introduce a merger “call-in” power. This could enable the authority to review transactions that fall below existing turnover thresholds but may threaten competition—transactions it currently cannot examine. Officials noted that the model is already used in several European countries. Participants raised concerns about predictability, legal certainty, procedural requirements, standstill obligations, and the effects on deal processes. The Slovak authority is also considering a call-in model.
The authority is additionally proposing personal penalties for managers who intentionally enter into horizontal cartel agreements, as well as for attempts and for organizing, instigating, or assisting such conduct. Proposed sanctions include fines of up to CZK 10 million and a ban on professional activity for up to five years. The proposal would also provide for leniency for individuals, including immunity for the first person to report a cartel and reduced penalties for subsequent applicants. Speakers discussed the need for coordination and information-sharing between the competition authority and criminal enforcement bodies, while noting differences between administrative and criminal liability.
The conference also addressed the concept of a single continuous infringement of competition law. Further sessions were scheduled on significant market power, inspections, and no-poach agreements between employers.
